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PROTECTION OF ALIEN RIGHTS UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Gonzales v. Shea' the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado held that requiring United States citizenship as a
condition of eligibility for receiving benefits under Colorado's Old
Age Pension law did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.2 Plaintiffs, resident aliens of the United States
and residents of Colorado, would have been eligible to receive benefits
under the program had they met the citizenship requirement. They
filed a class action3 contending that the citizenship requirement
constituted an invidious classification and sought declaratory relief'
invalidating the requirement.5 While recognizing that aliens are
protected by the fourteenth amendment, the court held that the state
had a substantial interest in upholding the classification and
distinguished two other district court decisions6 as not involving
Colorado's unique pension program. Concluding that a holding of
invalidity might destroy the entire pension program, the court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 7
The holding in Gonzales represents a significant departure from
the ever increasing judicial solicitude for protection of aliens under the
fourteenth amendment. When presented with comparable factual
situations and similar attacks upon the constitutionality of statutory
restrictions based on alienage, other courts have invalidated such
limitations.8 Resolution of this conflict in the decisions is extremely
1. 318 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1970).
2. Colorado's old age pension program was initiated in the form of a state constitutional
amendment and provides for the creation and maintenance of a special pension fund while
establishing basic qualifications for receipt of payments from that fund. CoLo. CoNsT. art. 24,
§ 1-9; CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-1-4(l)(a)(0, 101-1-5(l)(a)(c) (1963).
3. The suit was filed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2).
4. Relief was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964).
5. Plaintiffs also contended that the citizenship requirement denied them due process of law,
the right to travel freely interstate, and was contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), which provides
for equal rights under the law for all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
court considered the equal protection question to present the sole issue of merit. 318 F. Supp. at
577.
6. Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970),prob.juris. noted, 400 U.S. 956 (1970);
Richardson v. Graham, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970),prob.juris. noted, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
7. 318 F. Supp. at 579.
8. Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316
(D.V.l. 1970); Richardson v. Graham, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970); Purch & Fitzpatrick v.
State, 71 Cal. 2d 566,456 P.2d 645,79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
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significant because state restrictions on alien employment
opportunities,9 the right to hold land,'" and eligibility for state aid"
continue to be widespread. Furthermore, consideration of the factors
involved in resolving the alien's status under the fourteenth
amendment suggests an extension of the equal protection doctrine
that would also have implications in reference to classifications based
on other factors, such as age and sex.
The standard measure of review under the equal protection clause
only requires that the use of a state statutory classification be
rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate state interest.'2
Constitutional attacks on classifications, the validity of which are
measured by this test, are almost uniformly unsuccessful since there
need be only some relationship between the classification and a
conceivably legitimate state interest. '3 Also, because only a reasonable
relationship is demanded, states have great latitude in determining
how inclusive statutory classifications will be. 4 However, in reviewing
certain classifications, the Supreme Court has departed from the
traditional permissive standard of review and demanded more
compelling justification. '5
9. State legislation routinely restricts alien participation in various occupations. See, e.g.,
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 243.100(3) (1969) (forbidding aliens to sell or transport alcoholic
beverages); NEv. REV. STAT. § 464.101 (1967) (prohibiting ownership or operation of gambling
devices by aliens); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-5-14(a)(2)(b) (1966) (denying aliens employment as
dispensers and retailers of alcoholic beverages); S.D. Cozwi,. LAWs ANN. § 34-20-9 (1967)
(denying aliens a license to sell poison).
Twenty-two states have conditions for employment on public work projects which deny or
grossly restrict employment of aliens in this area. Comment, Equal Protection and Supremacy
Clause Limitations on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, 1970 UTAH L. Rav. 136 n.25; see
Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1012
(1957). See generally KONvrrY, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN ANEICAN LAW (1946); 5
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §294 (1938); Chamberlain, Aliens and the Right to Work,
18 A.B.A.J. 379 (1932); Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination Against the Alien
in His Right to Work, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 74 n.9 (1934).
10. For a listing of those limitations, see Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36
TEhip. L.Q. 15, 17-26 (1962).
11. See Note, State Discrimination Against Mexican Aliens, 38 Go. WASH. L. REV. 1091
(1970).
12. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346
(1949). Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1082 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920).
13. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961); Developments 1083.
14. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 12, at 348; Developments 1085.
15. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). See Developments 1088.
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Generally speaking, a classification that either affects the exercise
of a constitutional right or is based on suspect criteria denies equal
protection unless justified by a compelling state interest.'8 The
rationale behind this stepped-up review of classifications affecting
constitutional rights is that those rights are of such importance that a
state's decision to differentiate among classes of individuals in respect
to them must possess more than mere possible rationality. 17 Following
this reasoning, several Supreme Court decisions have been interpreted
as establishing that any classification which adversely affects basic
civil or personal interests requires a compelling justification. 8
However, in Dandridge v. Williams'9 the Court upheld a regulation
placing an absolute limit on the amount of welfare a family could
receive regardless of its size or actual need. Even though the most
basic needs of impoverished human beings were involved, the
reasonable basis standard was applied because the Court found that
no interest or freedom protected by the Bill of Rights was affected.
On the other hand, judicial identification of classifying factors
which are considered suspect and therefore lead to active review is
limited, and expliciation of the policy considerations involved in so
designating a factor is even more limited. .Although several bases of
16. The appropriate occasion for and limits of a stepped-up standard of review have never
been definitely articulated. The validity and substance of an actual bipartite pattern of review
rested solely upon occasional judicial references to the use of a more intensive standard of review
until the Supreme Court openly indicated its utilization of a dual standard in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Legal commentators conceptualized general notions
concerning when active scrutiny of a classification is applicable and outlined perceived standards
of such review. The discussion in Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
Rav. 1065 (1969), represents the most complete conceptualization of "active" review. For other
recent commentary, see Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent. 21 STAN. L. REv. 767,774-80 (1969). See generally Black,
Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. Rav.
69 (1967); Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARv. L. REV- 91 (1966); Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1147 (1966); Karst &
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT.
Rav. 39; McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection,
61 MiCm. L. Rrv. 645 (1963).
17. Developments 1128. It is also clear that the group of rights protected by the Constitution
is limited but not fully defined. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. E.g.. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (criminal appeals); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation).
19. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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statutory differentiation have been suggested as being "suspect,"2e
racial classifications represent the archetype and only uniformly
recognized suspect category. 2' A survey of relevant decisions and
commentary reveals two general bases for that characterization.
First, there is a presumptive probability that no rational relation
exists between the use of a racial classification and the furthering of a
legitimate state interest, because classifying on the basis of race is
possibly related to very few permissive state interests, 2 and because
racial classifications affect minority groups having a minimal ability
to participate effectively in the political process.? Second, racial
classifications are not favored because the past use of racial
classifications to designate inferiority has attached a stigma of
opprobrium to any classification on that basis. Even if a particular
racial classification is rational and not simply based on prejudice, it
will generally be perceived as a means of identifying and
discriminating against "second class" members of society. 2
20. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (wealth); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (lineage). The
implication in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), that illegitimacy is a suspect basis of classification was disregarded in
and has apparently been negated by Labine v. Vincent, 39 U.S.L.W. 4344 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971).
21. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Developments 1088 n.57.
22. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (dicta), The fact that race is a
congenital and unalterable trait reinforces the notion that it is presumptively not constitutionally
relevant. See Developments 1127, 1174.
23. Mr. Justice Stone's famous footnote constitutes the touchstone for special consideration
of minorities. "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 nA (1938). See Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,507-08 n.198 (D.D.C. 1967), affdsub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
24. Developments 1127. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions. 69 YALE
L.J. 421,424 (1960). The historical background of the fourteenth amendment has also been cited
as explaining special treatment for racial classifications. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1967); Developments 1125.
It should be noted that a classification affecting the exercise of a fundamental right is
"suspect" because of its effect on the exercise of that right. Such a form of suspect classification
simply represents a different conceptualization of the fundamental rights portion of the
compelling state interest test. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660 n.9 (1969). Also,
wealth has been considered a "suspect" basis for classification, not because a state's charging
payment for goods and services is irrational, but because the critical nature of certain interests
and services prompts special concern when the poor are discriminated against in respect to them.
See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
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When active judicial review is triggered by a state's use of suspect
classifying criteria or the impact of the criteria on the exercise of a
constitutional right, the evaluation of whether the classification is
justified as furthering a compelling state interest first involves a
consideration of the general importance of the interest to be served.2s
In some decisions involving active review, establishing the requisite
governmental interest has involved both a consideration of the
magnitude of the state interest and a determination of whether such
interest outweighed the disadvantage suffered by the class adversely
affected by the statute.26 However, in Shapiro v. Thompson, where the
compelling interest test was first openly articulated by the Supreme
Court, the Court simply evaluated the importance of the state interest
without regard to the disadvantage suffered by the affected class.2Y In
practical terms the use of either approach probably represents only a
difference between explicit and implicit balancing.2s A court that
perceives or does not perceive a state interest of compelling import
using either method would be very unlikely to view things differently
following the other approach.29 Furthermore, even if the interest
served is considered compelling, the use of the classification must
itself be more than reasonably appropriate. A substantial degree of
connection must exist between using the particular classification and
realizing the stated objective.3 0 Finally, a classification is not
compellingly justified if alternative means of accomplishing the
desired result exist that do not involve use of suspect criteria or
similarly affect a fundamental right.31
Although recognizing that the alien is protected by the fourteenth
394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (dicta); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
Lineage and illegitimacy have been viewed as suspect for the same reasons as race. See
Developments 1124-27.
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
26. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963). Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), with Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Developments 1103-04, 1122-23.
27. 394 U.S. 618,638 (1969).
28. It might be argued that when a fundamental right is affected by a classification, no
explicit balancing is appropriate since a demand for a public interest of importance represents
implicit weighing of both public and private interests.
29. No opinion has been found which makes reference to a conscious decision to use one
approach as opposed to the other in determining whether a compelling state interest is furthered.
30. See Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANs. Q. I (1965).
31. Id.
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amendment, 32 the Supreme Court in the early twentieth century,
utilizing the lesser standard of review, repeatedly validated restrictions
on alien status. The alien's rights to hold land,1 share in the resources
of the state,- find employment in public work," and work in several
private occupations" were limited and in many instances abrogated.
States were considered to have a proprietory interest in conserving
public employment and resources for their rightful owners, the
citizens of the state, and exclusion of non-citizens from those benefits
was viewed as rationally related to a permissible state interest.3 The
state'9 interest in regulating harmful and dangerous private
occupations was viewed as reasonably furthered by excluding one
class, aliens, from employment in those occupations.38 The disability
of aliens to hold land freely was grounded on both the interest of the
state as proprietor of the citizens' resources and the state's police
power to insure proper use of state land. 39 Even so, in 1915 the
Supreme Court did restrict a flagrant application of an under-
inclusive classification in holding that the police power only
authorized exclusion of aliens from occupations in which the state
held a "special interest." 40 Excluding aliens from "common
occupations" was held not to be related rationally to promoting the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of individuals within the state.4'
32. Protection of the fourteenth amendment was extended to aliens in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
33. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Frich v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
34. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1877).
35. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903). For
criticism of those decisions, see Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to
Work, 57 COLUbI. L. REv. 1012 (1957); Note, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUAI. L.
REv. 99 (1916); Note, National Power to Control State Discrimination Against Goods and
Persons: A Study in Federalism, 12 STAN. L. REv. 355, 367 (1960).
36. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Dechebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S.
623 (1912).
37. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138
(1914); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
38. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Dechebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S.
623 (1912).
39. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Frich v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb
v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
40. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
41. 239 U.S. at 41-43.
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In the 1940's the Supreme Court began to consider more closely
restrictive classifications related to alienage. In Korematsu v. United
States 2 the Court, although upholding restrictions on persons of
Japanese ancestry during World War II, stated that such restrictions
are "immediately suspect," must be subjected to "rigid scrutiny,"
and were only justified by "public necessity." 43 Also, even though in
Oyama v. California" the Court declined to invalidate California's
alien land law' s it did void a statutory presumption that land
purchased by an ineligible alien and recorded in his son's name was
not a gift to his citizen son. The court equated the presumption with
discrimination against the citizen gon on the basis of his racial discent
and stated that only a compelling justification could sustain such
discrimination. Furthermore, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission" it was held that any proprietary interest of the state as
trustee-owner of fish swimming three miles off-shore was insufficient
to justify exclusion of aliens from commercial fishing. Significantly,
the Supreme Court eschewed reliance on the fact that the statute was
blatantly designed to only prohibit one racial group, alien Japanese,
from fishing. The fourteenth amendment was said to
protect "all persons" against state legislation bearing unequally upon them
either because of alienage or color .... [and]
... the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.A7
As a result of Korematsu, Oyama, and Takahashi, questions have
arisen as to the validity of the earlier cases upholding restrictions on
aliens, and alienage has often been referred to as a "suspect" basis of
classification. However, the more intensive review by the Court in
those cases could be interpreted as based upon an equivalence in fact
between restrictive classification of aliens and discrimination based
on race or ancestral lineage. For in each instance, the statutes were
42. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (curfew
on all persons of Japanese ancestry upheld).
43. 323 U.S. at 216.
44. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
45. "The Alien Land Law forbids aliens ineligible for American citizenship to acquire, own,
occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land." 332 U.S. at 636.
46. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
47. 334 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
48. E.g., Developments 1125; 38 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.,supra note 11, at 1102; 1970 UTAH L.
REv., supra note 9, at 136.
The Supreme Court itself specifically cited Takahashi to illustrate an "inherently suspect"
classification. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,628 n.9 (1969).
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meant to and did affect only lone group of aliens, the Japanese.
Furthermore, although the Court referred generally to alienage in
Takahashi, it also cited the cases relying on the proprietary power of
the state over state resources and did not explicitly overrule them.,9
Also, there is language in the opinion that may be interpreted to mean
that, irrespective of the validity of the proprietary theory itself, the
state in that instance simply did not have sufficient property interest
in the offshore fish to justify application of its proprietary power.r0
Moreover, there is still other language indicating that the decision
simply involved regulation of a private occupation and the invalidity
of excluding one group from commercial fishing without a special
public interest in so doing.5'
In attempting to delineate the degree of alien protection under the
fourteenth amendment, different lower courts have reached somewhat
varied results. In Hosier v. Evans52 a federal district court invalidated
restrictions on alien children's rights to attend public school. The
court did not allude to alienage as an inherently suspect basis of
classification but grounded its demand for more than a rational
relationship to advancing the public welfare solely on the fact that the
"right" to free public education was affected. In Richardson v.
Graham 3 an Arizona federal district court invalidated a 15-year
residency requirement for aliens as a condition of eligibility for
general welfare assistance, assistance for the blind, and old age
assistance. The court made brief mention of Takahashi but basically
relied upon Shapiro v. Thompson,54 which held that a citizen's right to
49. The Court cited McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), and Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914), without commenting on their validity. 334 U.S. at 420-21.
50. "'To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean on a slender reed'. . . .. We think
that same statement is equally applicable here" 334 U.S. at 421.
51. "Ve are unable to find that the 'special public interest' on which California relies
provides support for this state ban on Takahashi's commercial fishing." Id. at 420.
The difficulty in interpreting Takahashi is highlighted by the fact that even commentators
who agree that case did not make alienage "suspect," disagree in their overall interpretations.
One student commentator believes that the decision invalidated the line of alien cases relying on
the proprietary rationale while the cases relying on the police power of the state to regulate
working conditions were not overruled. 11 HARV. ITrr'L L.J. 228, 236 (1970). However, a federal
district court judge has maintained that Takahashi was a case that only involved regulation of
private enterprise and was not concerned with the proprietary interest of the state in its
resources. Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa.) (dissenting opinion), prob. juris. noted,
400 U.S. 956 (1970).
52. 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
53. 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970).
54. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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travel was so affected by a residency requirement for state aid that a
compelling state interest must be posited. The Richardson court
implicitly extended the right to travel to aliens and upon finding a lack
of a compelling state interest, voided the residency requirements. Even
though Shapiro and its supporting cases indicate that the right to
travel extends only to citizens, 55 general language in other cases
indicates that it should extend to aliens. 6 More importantly, denial of
aid altogether to aliens would avoid interference with any travel right
since there would be no discrimination in terms of the exercise or non-
exercise of the Shapiro right to travel; an alien would not feel
constrained to remain in a state so that he eventually could fulfill the
residency requirement and receive aid. Thus, the Richardson decision
in no way resolves the status of alienage classifications themselves
under the equal protection clause.
In Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State7 the California Supreme Court
unanimously held a statute prohibiting employment of aliens on
public works projects to be invalid. The court interpreted Takahashi
to mean that alienage was a suspect basis of classification and that the
proprietary theory no longer had vitality. Emphasis was placed on the
irrationality of preserving state resources solely for their supposed
owners, the citizens of the state, when aliens must pay taxes and serve
in the armed forces. This irrationality was seen to be increased by the
fact that aliens may live and work within a state and contribute to its
economic growth for many years. It was also stressed that the
proprietary rationale had partially rested on the doctrine that a state
has unqualified power in extending privileges' and that such a right-
privilege distinction no longer has legitimacy. 59 The court further held
55. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 181"(Douglas, J., concurring), 183-85 (Jackson, J., concurring) (1941); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 wall.) 418, 430 (1870);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,552 (No.
3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)
(freedom to travel outside United States).
56. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33,42 (1915).
57. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969) (en banc).
58. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 159, 164, 108 N.E. 425, 430, affd, 239 U.S. 195, 199
(1915); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
59. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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that the police power of the state to promote acceptable wages and
working conditions in the construction industry did not authorize
exclusion of aliens from the industry since the classification bore no
rational relationship to any valid implementation of that power. In
light of the court's rejection of the proprietary and police power
rationale, the classification in Purdy would necessarily seem to fail
even under- permissive standards because no other legitimate state
interests related to the exclusion of aliens from public works were
offered. However, notwithstanding its earlier analysis, the court,
rather cryptically, also conceded that favoring United States citizens
over citizens of other countries was a legitimate state interest without
providing an explanation of how such discrimination was legitimate.
Thus, the characterization of alienage as suspect appears to have been
crucial; the statute was invalidated only -because it favored United
States citizens in the absence of a compelling state interest.6
A divided Pennsylvania federal district court in Leger v. Sailer"
relied on Purdy in striking down a statute which denied general
welfare assistance to aliens. The same arguments used in Purdy were
marshalled against the validity of the proprietary rationale, but the
same concession was made in recognizing that "[t]here may be an
area in which the state may permissiably preserve natural resources
for its own citizens by discriminating against aliens .... ,,12 The
court further recognized a valid state interest in conserving the state
treasury but viewed that interest outweighed in the present case by the
severity of the deprivation upon the excluded group.6 3 Such an
analysis creates the same logical difficulties noted in reference to
Purdy. States do have a legitimate interest in conserving state funds,
but even under permissive equal protection standards the selection of
a group to exclude from aid in order to economize must be rational.
In other words, if a state has only enough funds to aid a certain
60. Besides invalidating the statute on equal protection grounds, the court also found that it
encroached upon the congressional scheme for immigration and naturalization. 71 Cal. 2d at
572-78, 456 P.2d at 649-53, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 81-85. See 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 11,
at 1110-11; 11 HARV. INT'I L.. 228, 229-34 (1970). See generally 12 STAN. L. Rav., supra note
35.
61. 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
62. Id. at 255.
63. There was evidence that non-citizen applicants for general assistance are less than 100
per year. Id. at 254. The dissenting judge felt that Takahashi simply involved regulation of
commercial fishing, denied that it had made alienage "suspect" or that it had discredited the
proprietary rationale, and would have upheld denial of assistance on that basis. Id. at 256.60
(dissenting opinion).
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percentage of needy individuals, it cannot arbitrarily exclude one class
of individuals to make its aid program fiscally feasible. If the
proprietary theory is truly invalid, then, given the absence of any state
interest other than simply the desire to favor citizens over aliens,
exclusion of aliens from state aid should fail without the necessity of
balancing the interest involved. Moreover, the implication of the
singular use of a balancing approach is that a great increase in the
number of alien applicants for aid might cost the state so much money
as to predicate a compelling interest in economy and thus validate the
denial of aid to aliens.
In Gonzales v. Shea6" the lack of any invidious purpose or motive
in the origin of the citizen requirement was initially noted. The court
recognized that the old age pension law involved basic economic needs
but relied on Dandridge v. Williams's in holding that the interests
affected did not merit application of the compelling interest test.
However, the court did conclude that in Takahashi, because of the
presence of a classification based on alienage, the Supreme Court had
applied a balancing test66 which demanded a stronger state interest
than that required in standard equal protection review. Yet, alienage
was not necessarily viewed as "suspect." Even so, the court concluded
that in view of Takahashi and because a balancing approach appeared
more reasonable and less mechanical than applying a proprietary
criterion, there should be at least a guarded or cautious weighing of
opposing interests. In applying that balancing test, the court reasoned
that since the plaintiffs were receiving other forms of public
assistance, the infringement on personal interests was less drastic and
severe in the instant situation than had existed in Dandridge. The
pension program was seen as a'special and deeply rooted one, funded
in the nature of a trust, adopted and maintained after bitter struggle.
Moreover, because the citizenship requirement probably could not be
severed, a holding of invalidity would destroy the program and
adversely affect the interests of the recipients for whose benefit the
fund was created. Because of these factors the court considered that
the Colorado amendment was unique and distinguished both Leger
and Richardson as involving discrimination of greater magnitude
when weighed against the state interest. Even though a need for a
64. 318 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1970).
65. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
66. The court felt that a balancing test was "similar" to the compelling state interest test
enunciated and articulated in Shapiro. 318 F. Supp. at 578.
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compelling interest had been disavowed, the court found that the
reasons supporting the classification were compelling and sustained
its validity.
Several preliminary observations may be made concerning
Gonzales. Although proof of an impermissible motive or purpose may
be relevant to prove invidious discrimination, lack of such a motive or
purpose certainly does not cure a functionally invidious scheme of
discrimination.6 Furthermore, in evaluating the personal interests
affected, the court should have considered that some aliens might be
solely dependent on old age assistance for subsistence. Yet, a more
basic difficulty exists with the analysis in Gonzales. While
consideratioA of the importance of a state's objective is relevant when
compelling justification for a classification is deemed necessary, equal
protection analysis more basically centers on evaluating the degree of
rational relationship between the use of a particular classification and
furthering a legitimate state interest.68 At no time did the Gonzales
court consider how the exclusion of the class of aliens from eligibility
for pension benefits, as opposed to excluding any other group,
furthered any permissive state interest. Proper equal protection
analysis demands that a choice of a classification involve more than
an ability to make a program politically acceptable.69 The Gonzales
reasoning would justify any statutory classificetion if used in a
program of overall importance and if continued existence of the
program depended on retention of the classification. For example, if a
state only provided welfare benefits to needy Democrats because
Democrats were in the majority, had done so for numerous years with
wide acceptance, and could not secure the passage of a general welfare
statute for political reasons, the state would have the same
"compelling interest" in upholding the program as existed in
Gonzales.
Despite the weaknesses in the Gonzales decision, the recognition
that alienage is not a "suspect" classification, the use of which
demands full compelling justification, must be applauded.
Notwithstanding the apparent conclusiveness of the holdings in Purdy
67. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,266 (1962); Valtiera v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. James N. Valtierra, 39 U.S.L.W. 4488 (U.S.
April 27, 1971). For an excellent discussion of when proof of bad motive is relevant and implicit
recognition that lack of proof of bad motive is irrelevant, see Ely, Legislative and Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-22, 1269-75 (1970).
68. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 12, at 344; Developments 1076.
69. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 12, at 349-50.
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and Leger, there is neither legitimate precedent nor any other valid
reason for so characterizing alienage classifications. First of all, the
alien cases referring to classifications as meriting strict scrutiny all
involved restrictions on one particular group of aliens.70 In Takahashi,
when the Supreme Court indicated that the state's power to apply its
laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants was confined within narrow
limits, the Court was merely noting that application of traditional
-fourteenth amendment standards and the supremacy of federal laws
governing alien status limited the state's power to regulate aliens.71 Of
greater importance is the fact that classifying on the basis of alienage
is simply not "suspect" in the manner or to the degree as classifying
on the basis of race. No badge of inferiority is associated with
alienage classifications. Also, alienage is not an immutable, inherent
quality which, when used as a classifying factor, is possibly related to
very few permissible state objectives. Alienage is a governmentally
created status that is clearly relevant when used to classify individuals
in order to further some state interests. In some contexts special
treatment of those who do not meet the requirements of citizenship is
manifestly justified; for example, the validity of federal differentiation
between citizens and aliens in regulating entry into the country is
axiomatic.72 Even so, at least some elements of the panoply of federal
regulations over immigration and alien status within the United
States facilitate only the convenience and administrative process of
the federal government.73 However, invalidation of such regulations
because classification of aliens is "suspect" and need serve a
compelling interest would seem rather strange.74 The classification of
aliens in that context appears presumptively rational, and, unless no
reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest can be shown, voiding
such a classification is unwarranted. Likewise, one may disagree with
the particular requirements of citizenship, but the very essence of
citizenship is membership in the body politic; 75 a prerequisite of
citizenship to vote or hold public office would seem eminently
70. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
71. 334 U.S. at 419-20.
72. See8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1964).
73. E.g., id. §§ 1301-06 (1964) (providing for registration of aliens).
74. It is assumed that the federal government is subject to an equal protection requirement
by means of the fifth amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
75. See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 165-66 (1874).
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reasonable. Yet, if aIienage is "suspect," a requirement of citizenship
for a state or local office must further a compelling state interest.
Given the rigor of that test the requirement might conceivably fail.
Admittedly, some courts would sustain such restrictions because of
their obvious rationality and in so doing recognize the requisite state
interest. However, the point to be made is that even the possibility of
invalidation on such a basis illustrates the weaknesses of
straightforward application of a compelling interest test to the
classification of aliens.
Proper application of simply the reasonable relation standard of
review should invalidate the type of restrictions reviewed in Purdy,
Leger, and Gonzales. All three courts concluded that the proprietary
rationale could not by itself validate the discrimination in each case.
Although the Supreme Court in Takahaski did not make alienage
"suspect," it did indicate that the proprietary rationale would not
support exclusion of aliens from a private occupation or enjoyment of
state resources. 76 The "demise of the right-privilege distinction,"'7 the
equality of obligations, and the probability of equality of contribution
to the state by the alien do establish that the alien is no less
"deserving" of receiving aid or holding public employment than the
citizen. This reasoning implies that the state interest of favoring
citizens over aliens voiced in Purdy is simply a restatement of the
decision to discriminate and is not legitimate. Similarly, the state
interests cited in Leger and Gonzales are valid, but the choice of the
classification excluding aliens is not rationally related to furthering
them.
Even though alienage classifications do not justifiably trigger a
demand for compelling justification and even though the restrictions
in the foregoing cases should have failed under any equal protection
standard, difficulties remain. The widespread references to and
treatment of alienage classifications as "suspect" are not without
some meaning or merit. Aliens are not merely politically
disadvantaged along with many other groups in society; they are
without the power of the ballot and have no political power.
Furthermore, a past history of open discrimination against them does
76. "To whatever extent the fish. . . may be 'capable of ownership' by California, we think
that 'ownership' is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful
residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean offits shores while permitting
all others to do so." 334 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
77. Van Alstyne, note 59 supra.
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exist.78 Thus, even though the use of alienage classifications is clearly
related to furthering some legitimate state interests and does not
represent a badge of inherent inferiority, such classifications do share
with racial classifications a greater likelihood of irrationality than
other bases. In most instances, when there is no reason for any
suspected irrationality in classification, the traditional standard of
review is tolerable and desirable even though it is extremely permissive
and allows states great latitude in classification. With neutral bases
on which to classify, no proclivity toward purely invidious
discrimination exists, and the political process effectively checks such
discrimination.79 However, the likelihood of invidious discrimination
against aliens and their lack of any political power indicates that
similar deference to restrictions on aliens is unjustified and
unwarranted.
While neither the permissive nor the compelling interest standard
of review as presently conceptualized can properly be applied to
alienage classifications, an intermediate standard of review should be
formulated which reflects the limited suspect nature of those
classifications. A preliminary determination should be made as to
whether aliens constitute the basic group ideally affected by a statute.
A statute restricting aliens which is neither under-inclusive or over-
inclusive with respect to furthering a valid state interest should be
upheld. Such a determination must allow for the practical difficulties
and exigencies in attempting to draft any statute. However, to satisfy
the test a state must demonstrate not only the rationality of affecting
aliens but also must posit a direct connection between affecting only
aliens and realizing a legitimate purpose. The availability of more
exact means of classification certainly would be relevant in
determining whether a statute is substantially precise. Such
substantial precision in classification would sufficiently indicate the
rationality of the classification in that particular context. However,
when the classification does not identify the class ideally affected, a
fully compelling state interest should be evidenced. Because of the
suspect-albeit limited-nature of classifying on the basis of alienage,
the state should be required to show a great need to classify on that
basis in order to insure against purely invidious discrimination when
aliens do not comprise the class ideally affected.
78. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 651 (1948) (concurring opinion); Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
79. See Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955).
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The suggested scope of intermediate review should accurately
reflect the nature of special concern for classifications based on
alienage. In other instances of active review it is always logical to
require the furtherance of a state interest of magnitude. For example,
when a fundamental right is affected, a compelling state interest is
needed to outweigh the effect on personal rights even if a classification
is precise."' Furthermore, because of the stigma attached to racial
classifications, a demand that the state always posit a compelling
interest in classifying on that basis is appropriate. However, the
suspected irrationality of classifying on the basis of alienage can be
allayed in some instances without demanding a compelling state
interest; then, limited active review is appropriate.
Use of an intermediate standard of review would not be without
considerable difficulty. The determination of whether a classification
is precisely related to furthering a particular state interest is certainly
not automatic nor necessarily easily resolvable. However, a
determination of that nature is presently a part of full active review,
and no additional form of judicial inquiry is required.81 Some cases,
such as the determination of whether citizenship is a legitimate pre-
requisite to vote, are capable of easy adjudication. However, other
cases will remain very difficult. For example, a requirement of United
States citizenship for admission to a state bar82 does not represent a
precisely drawn classification. The moral qualities and adherence to
the principles of our legal system do not necessarily presuppose
allegiance to and membership in the body politic of the United States.
However, the requirement is not without rationality. Other factors
being equal, a United States citizen is more likely than an alien to
recognize and adhere to the precepts of our legal system. Also, the
practical cost of assessing the character of an alien in many cases
would be prohibitive. Yet, because a more precisely drawn
requirement, such as placing the burden on the applicant of financing
and satisfying an examining committee of one's requisite character,
would enable at least some aliens to establish legitimate qualification,
the citizenship requirement probably should fail.
Finally, this intermediate pattern of review provides a means of
80. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
81. Evaluating the precision of a classification involves the same type of inquiry as does the
demand for substantial connection between a classification and the furthering of a state interest
made under present standards of active review. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
82. E.g., UTAH CODnE ANN. § 78-51-10 (1953).
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expanding judicial notions of bases of classification that merit
something more than traditional review. Presently, equal protection
review is either very permissive or extremely demanding. Thus,
although certain bases of classification-sex 3 and age,84 especially for
youths under voting age-have been suggested as "suspect" because
of a suspicioned irrationality in their use, active review is now so
stringent that suspect characterization portends invalidating all
classifications utilizing those criteria. Resistance to such a
characterization can presently be justified because of the value and
rationality of using those classifying factors in certain contexts. As
demonstrated in reference to alienage, a degree of intermediate review
is possible that would provide considerable protection against the
invidious use of such factors in statutory classification but would also
allow for their use when demonstrably appropriate.
83. Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 430 Pa. 642,253 A.2d 400 (1968), noted in 82 HARV. L.
R V. 821 (1969); Developments 1174. For implicit treatment of sex as a "suspect" basis of
classification, see Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969).
84. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural Law Due Process Formula". 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716,
741 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENvER L.J. 582 (1968).
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